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PREVIEW; State of Montana v. Laird: Prosecutorial Delay,
Insufficient Evidence, and Hearsay
Calder Thingvold*
Oral arguments are scheduled for Wednesday, May 1, 2019,
at 10:00 a.m. in Ballroom A of the Strand Union Building on the
Montana State University Campus in Bozeman, Montana. An
introduction to the oral argument will begin at 9:30 a.m.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case presents three issues for review: 1) what
constitutes actual prejudice for an unconstitutional prosecutorial
delay; 2) whether the State may use circumstantial evidence to prove
cause of death in a homicide case when that cause is in question; and
3) whether testimony from an unavailable witness is hearsay when
it is introduced to describe the steps taken during an autopsy.
In 2016, Defendant Brian Laird (Laird) was convicted of
murdering his wife, Kathryn, who died in 1999.1 On appeal, Laird
argues his case must be dismissed because the 15-year prosecutorial
delay violated his due process rights and because the State failed to
present sufficient evidence that he murdered Kathryn.2
Alternatively, Laird argues that the district court improperly
admitted hearsay testimony and an unduly prejudicial photograph
from Kathryn’s autopsy.3 The State responds that Laird was not
unduly prejudiced by the delay.4 Further, the State argues it
presented sufficient evidence to show that Laird, not an accident,
killed Kathryn.5 Finally, the State argues that the district court
properly admitted the testimony and the photograph.6
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Kathryn’s body was found in the “Afterbay” area on July 31,
*Calder Thingvold, a 2019 juris doctor candidate at the Alexander
Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, interned in the
Appellate Division of the Montana State Public Defender’s Office during 2019
but was not involved with the State v. Laird appeal in any capacity.
1
Appellee’s Response Brief at 1, 12, State v. Laird,
https://perma.cc/9U38-YJVX (Mont. Nov. 1, 2016) (No. DA 16-0473).
2
Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief at 16–18, State v. Laird,
https://perma.cc/Y8GT-DAPY (Mont. Oct. 16, 2018) (No. DA 16-0473).
3
Id. at 36, 39.
4
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 24.
5
Id. at 24–25.
6
Id. at 25.
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1999.7 Witness reported seeing Laird arguing with Kathryn in the
preceding days, sometimes turning violent.8 The night before
Kathryn died, the pair argued at her workplace and Laird’s
neighbors, Kathleen and Erik, heard raised voices at the Laird’s
home that evening.9 Later, Kathleen saw a male figure drive away
from the Laird residence and later still heard their daughter’s dog,
who had a history of aggression towards males, barking in the
direction of the Afterbay walking path.10
The next morning, Laird visited Kathryn’s friend Tanya and
told her Kathryn was missing.11 Laird said he had argued with
Kathryn when she arrived home the previous night, and he had then
driven to the Afterbay parking lot.12 Kathryn found him there and
they eventually returned home, where Laid reported she seemed
agitated and suicidal.13 Tanya and Laird unsuccessfully searched for
Kathryn before Laird called 911 to report her disappearance, and
Tanya then found Kathryn’s body floating in the Afterbay.14
The county coroner responded to the scene, then arterially
embalmed the body before an autopsy, which is a process known to
make bruises appear darker than usual.15 Dr. Mueller autopsied
Kathryn’s body, then brought in Dr. Bennett for a second autopsy.16
FBI Agent Jackson secured a warrant, searched Laird’s trailer, and
found potential evidence that Laird accounted for.17 Agent Jackson
also received a tip that Kathleen heard an argument the night before
Kathryn died, but he did not recall following up with her.18
Laird was not charged until 2014 after the re-discovery of a
note containing Kathleen’s contact information and other possible
evidence.19 The district court denied Laird’s pretrial motion to
dismiss for unfairly prejudicial delay and loss of evidence, finding
Laird’s argument that lost evidence would have helped his case
speculative and that he had failed to demonstrate undue prejudice.20
The district court also denied Laird’s motion to dismiss at the close
Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 3.
Id. at 4.
9
Id. at 4–5.
10
Id.
11
Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 6.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 7.
15
Id. at 8.
16
Id. at 10.
17
Id. at 7–8.
18
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 15.
19
Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 15.
20
Id. at 21.
7
8
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of the State’s case-in-chief due to lack of sufficient evidence.21 At
trial, Laird objected to the State’s evidence, offered through Agent
Jackson, regarding Dr. Mueller’s comments during the autopsy and
a photograph showing Kathryn’s exposed skull.22 The district court
admitted the statement for the limited purpose of describing a shift
in the tone of the autopsy and admitted the photograph.23
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Prosecutorial Delay
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
protects an individual from oppressive prosecutorial delays,
requiring that charges be dismissed when a trial would violate
fundamental judicial fairness.24 Oppressive delays are evaluated
under a two-step test that first asks whether the delay actually,
substantially prejudiced the defendant.25 If so, the court then
examines the State’s reasons for the delay and weighs those reasons
against the defendant’s prejudice, weighing intentional or reckless
delay more heavily against the State than delay resulting from
negligence.26
1. Appellant/Defendant Brian Laird
Laird argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
pretrial motion for prosecutorial delay because he demonstrated
actual prejudice.27 Laird relies on State v. Passmore28 and State v.
Taylor29 to support his argument that prejudice in the context of
delay contemplates more than just “helpful” evidence, and instead it
also includes the “impairment” of a defendant’s ability to present
their defense.30
First, Laird argues the deaths of potential witnesses Russell
Renner and Dr. Mueller impaired his ability to defend himself
effectively, as did the loss of body tissue evidence.31 Dr. Mueller’s
report following Kathryn’s initial autopsy sparked suspicions about
21

Id. at 2.
Id. at 37–38.
23
Id. at 39.
24
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977).
25
Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 20.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 21.
28
225 P.3d 1229 (Mont. 2010).
29
960 P.2d 773 (Mont. 1998).
30
Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 21.
31
Id.
22
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Laird’s involvement in the death.32 According to Laird, the State
used statements about Dr. Mueller’s suspicions concerning
Kathryn’s bruising to establish her manner of death and convince
the jury of Laird’s involvement.33 Laird alleges that his inability to
confront Dr. Mueller due to prosecutorial delay prejudiced him
substantially.34 Laird similarly argues that Renner’s death also
unfairly prejudiced him, as Renner would have corroborated Laird’s
version of events.35 Lastly, Laird argues the loss of body tissue
evidence was unfairly prejudicial because Laird’s medical expert,
Dr. Bennett, could not re-examine the samples to confirm his
recollections that Kathryn’s bruising occurred post-mortem as a
result of embalmment.36
Laird next contends the State’s reasons for delay do not
outweigh his prejudice. According to Laird, the State’s argument
that it could not bring charges earlier because key evidence was not
discovered and investigated until 2012 is not good cause for delay
because the State possessed the note since 1999; Laird argues it was
negligence, and maybe even reckless disregard, for a homicide
investigation not to timely pursue all possible leads.37 Thus, Laird
argues the prolonged prosecutorial delay substantially impaired his
ability to mount an effective defense and the State’s reasons for
delay do not outweigh these adverse results.38
2. Appellee/Plaintiff State
The State responds that the absent witnesses and lost
evidence helped Laird’s defense, pointing to Laird’s use of Dr.
Bennett’s testimony for an alternative explanation for Kathryn’s
bruises as helpful and arguing that Dr. Mueller’s unavailability
aided this testimony because he could not contradict Dr. Bennett.39
Further, Dr. Mueller’s absence did not impede Laird’s ability to
cross-examine witnesses present at the autopsy with Dr. Mueller.40
The State also argues that Laird’s assessment of the benefit
of Renner’s testimony to his defense is speculative. The parties
dispute what statements Renner made to the FBI, and Laird did not

32

Id. at 23.
Id. at 22–23.
34
Id. at 23.
35
Id. at 24.
36
Id. at 26.
37
Id. at 28.
38
Id.
39
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 30.
40
Id. at 29.
33

2019

PREVIEW: MONTANA V. LAIRD

99

provide Renner’s statements to the district court for review.41
Further, the State was unable to cross-examine Renner about his
relationship to Laird and possibly undermine the statements’
authenticity.42 The loss of body tissue samples, the State argues, also
aided Laird because Dr. Bennett was able to present his recollection
regarding the samples without fear of contradiction from the State.43
Even if Laird could establish prejudice from the delay, the
State argues that its reasons for delaying the prosecution weighed in
favor of the State. Agent Jackson’s failure to follow up on the tip
about Kathleen in 1999 was mere negligence on the State’s part,
which should not weigh against the State as unfairly prejudicial to
Laird.44
3. Analysis
The question here is whether prejudice from delay only
considers the loss of helpful evidence or whether it also
contemplates impairment of the defense as prejudicial. Laird asserts
that while he successfully demonstrated a loss of helpful evidence,
the test for determining prejudice should not be limited to “helpful”
evidence if the loss materially affects a defendant’s ability to
confront the State’s case.45
Framed this way, Laird’s argument about his inability to
cross-examine Dr. Mueller might prove persuasive, considering the
State’s use of Dr. Mueller’s statements in closing argument, where
the State used the statement to suggest that after the doctor examined
the bruises, Laird became the sole suspect.46 The Court may not need
to consider Laird’s argument to find prejudice where the lost
evidence is not necessarily helpful; the use of the statement in
closing argument presents the Court with the question of whether
the State impermissibly used it beyond the limited scope for which
it was admitted. If so, the Court must consider whether the use of
the statement and the impossibility of cross-examining Dr. Mueller
deprived Laird of a fair trial. Given the State’s use of the statement
in closing to directly blame Laird, it is likely the Court may find it
to be materially harmful evidence and find Dr. Mueller’s absence
prejudicial to Laird’s defense. Should the Court agree with Laird on
this issue, there would be no need to proceed to the next two
41

Id. at 31.
Id.
43
Id. at 32–33.
44
Id. at 34.
45
Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 21.
46
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 7, State v. Laird, https://perma.cc/PP5AB85B (Mont. Dec. 24, 2018) (No. DA 16-0473).
42
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arguments.
B. Sufficient Evidence
Due process requires the State to prove every element of a
criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt.47 Here, the State had to
prove Laird purposefully or knowingly caused Kathryn’s death.48
1. Appellant/Defendant Brian Laird
Laird argues the State failed to prove the causation element
in Kathryn’s death beyond a reasonable doubt because it did not use
a medical expert to establish the exact cause of Kathryn’s physical
incapacitation.49 In support, Laird points to several Nevada cases
establishing the State’s burden to affirmatively prove a criminal act
caused the death and that circumstantial evidence showing only the
possibility of such an act is insufficient.50 Laird argues against the
State’s theory that Kathryn was incapacitated prior to drowning,
stating this was not supported by affirmative proof that Laird
incapacitated her. The State did not use a medical expert to testify
to the cause of incapacitation, so Laird argues the State’s use of
“suspicious” circumstances to point to his involvement was
insufficient.51 Laird argues this circumstantial evidence amounted
to mere speculation as to how Kathryn drowned.52 Laird further
argues that while the bruising around Kathryn’s neck may be
suspicious, the bruises alone were insufficient to prove a homicide
without the medical opinion.53
2. Appellee/Plaintiff State
Countering Laird’s arguments, the State distinguishes the
Nevada cases from the present action by pointing out that those
cases involved victims who died from natural causes.54 The State
argues that Kathryn’s death was not “natural,” leaving only
accident, suicide, or a criminal act as the cause.55 To rule out suicide,
Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 29.
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 34.
49
Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 32.
50
Id. at 34–35 (citing Frutiger v. State, 907 P.2d 158 (Nev. 1995);
Hicks v. Sheriff, 464 P.2d 462, 465 (Nev. 1970); Azbill v. State, 440 P.2d 1014,
1015–16 (Nev. 1968)).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 35–36.
53
Id. at 35.
54
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 35.
55
Id.
47
48
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the State pointed to several pieces of evidence, including Laird and
Kathryn’s arguments in the days before her death.56 Other evidence
included Tanya’s testimony that Kathryn made plans with her the
night she died, evidence of tearful conversations Kathryn had with
family members before her death, and Kathleen’s testimony
regarding what she heard the night Kathryn disappeared.57
The State also argues that evidence of Laird’s behavior
before discovering Kathryn’s body established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The State contends that Laird’s apparent failure
to make an effort to find Kathryn, taking Tanya to odd search
locations, and insistence on cremating Kathryn’s body immediately
despite her family members’ objections support the conclusion that
Kathryn did not commit suicide nor die accidentally.58 The evidence
also showed Kathryn was dragged to the water and did not fall into
the bay.59 According to the State, this evidence dismissed any
inference of suicide or accident and pointed to the conclusion that
Kathryn was murdered.60
3. Analysis
This issue considers what evidence sufficiently establishes
causation in a homicide case when the cause of injury is in question.
Neither party cites to a Montana case squarely answering the
question for a criminal trial. Laird points to Estate of Willson v.
Addison,61 which held that Montana requires a medical expert
opinion on causation to avoid summary judgment in civil cases, and
argues this requirement should extend to criminal cases.62 Laird
concedes that a medical expert opinion is not required to prove
causation when the cause of injury would be obvious to a layman.63
The State attempts to argue that the circumstantial evidence
resulting from the investigation sufficiently ruled out alternative
causes of death, leaving criminal activity the only possible cause.64
Should the Court agree with Laird that a medical expert is
needed when the cause of death is in question, the State might face
a more difficult task of proving causation in future homicide trials.
However, it does not appear likely to change the result of this case
56

Id.
Id. at 35–36.
58
Id. at 35–38.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 39.
61
258 P.3d 410 (Mont. 2011).
62
Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 32–33.
63
Id. at 33.
64
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 39.
57
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unless Laird successfully suppresses Dr. Mueller’s statements.
The State conceded there was no evidence of physical head
trauma or other injuries pointing to the cause of incapacitation,65
making the bruising Dr. Mueller observed around Kathryn’s neck
the sole source of suspicion. Dr. Mueller’s statement was presented
to the jury in a limited capacity as evidence of a shift in the tone of
the autopsy.66 Laird disputed this suspicion with Dr. Bennett’s
testimony that the bruises occurred after Kathryn died.67 The State
cross-examined Dr. Bennett to attempt to discredit his testimony,
which must have persuaded the jury since it convicted Laird.68
Therefore, unless Laird can suppress Dr. Mueller’s statement, the
Court may find in favor of the State on this issue even if the Court
agrees an expert opinion is required because the record shows Dr.
Mueller’s statement was more persuasive than Dr. Bennett’s
opinion.
C. Testimony and Photo Evidence
Testimonial statements made outside the courtroom and
offered for the truth of the matter asserted are generally inadmissible
unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.69 However, if the party
admitting the statement can show the testimony is relevant to a
theory other than the truth of the matter asserted, the statement may
be admitted.70 Additionally, relevant evidence may still be excluded
from trial if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the
possibility of prejudicing the jury or creating confusion.71
1. Defendant/Appellant Brian Laird
Laird argues the district court’s decision to admit Dr.
Mueller’s statement that he was “troubled” by the presence of
bruises on Kathryn’s neck is reversible error because Dr. Mueller
was not present at trial and Laird did not have a prior opportunity to
cross-examine him.72 Laird further asserts that the statement is
hearsay because the statement’s only possible relevance was to

65

Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
67
Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 12.
68
Id. at 14.
69
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004); Mont. R. Evid.
801(c); Mont. R. Evid. 802.
70
Siebken v. Voderberg, 359 P.3d 1073 (Mont. 2015).
71
Mont. R. Evid. 403.
72
Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 37–38.
66
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prove the truth of the matter: that Laird incapacitated Kathryn.73
Laird cites two Florida court cases that held that when the only
possible relevance of a statement is to the truth of the matter, the
admitting party may not attempt to hide the reason for admittance in
another theory.74 The testimony was supposedly admitted for the
limited purpose of demonstrating how the autopsy process changed
after the bruises were discovered.75 Laird argues this theory does not
exempt the hearsay exclusion of the statement because the
investigatory steps were irrelevant.76 He also argues the State’s
subsequent use of the statement to convince the jury of Laird’s guilt
shows that admitting the statement was not harmless error.77
Laird further argues that the admitted photograph showing
Kathryn’s skull with the skin peeled back was unduly prejudicial to
the defense because it improperly inflamed the jury’s emotions and
was not properly supported by any kind of foundation that the
injuries depicted caused Kathryn’s incapacitation.78
2. Plaintiff/Appellee State
The State argues the district court properly admitted Dr.
Mueller’s statement because it was offered to describe the
statement’s impact on the investigation.79 This limited purpose did
not admit the statement as hearsay because the State was only
allowed to briefly mention what the doctor said—focusing on how
the statement affected decisions, like a second autopsy—and it was
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.80 Further, even if the
testimony was hearsay, its admission was harmless error because
Agent Jackson was present at the autopsy and observed the same
bruises about which Laird could cross-examine him. Dr. Bennett,
Laird’s expert witness, also used Dr. Mueller’s statement to attempt
to show Kathryn’s death resulted from suicide or accident.81
The State counters Laird’s argument regarding the
photograph with Montana precedent holding that instructive
photographs are relevant and admissible as long they do not unduly

73

Id. at 38.
Id. (citing Tosta v. State, 786 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001); Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263, 274 (Fla. 2000)).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 39.
80
Id. at 40.
81
Id. at 41.
74
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prejudice the jury.82 The State argues that the photograph did not
unduly prejudice the jury because the exact cause of Kathryn’s death
was disputed, and the photograph was instructive to prove injuries
on Kathryn’s body and help the jury understand the case.83
3. Analysis
Laird appears to ask the Court to narrow a party’s ability to
admit hearsay evidence even if it is logically relevant to another
theory. The Court may address this question directly and revisit its
precedent for admittance of hearsay on another relevant theory, or
the Court may choose to decide the issue on narrower Rule 403
grounds. Should that happen, the most persuasive argument for
Laird is the State’s subsequent use of Dr. Mueller’s statement in its
closing argument as unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible hearsay.
By directly referencing the statement as the turning point in
the investigation and naming Laird as the only suspect resulting
from that shift,84 Laird’s argument that the State exceeded the scope
of the statement’s admittance is persuasive. Expressly connecting
the statement to Laird as a suspect makes the statement more
prejudicial than its intended use solely to explain the second
autopsy. However, the hurdle for this argument is whether Laird will
be able to prove the State’s subjective motivations at the time the
statement was admitted. Regardless, the Court likely will find
narrower Rule 403 grounds to determine the State impermissibly
used Dr. Mueller’s statements in the closing argument.
IV. CONCLUSION
The questions analyzed here are just a few of the many
considerations the Court will likely use to decide the case.
Regardless of whether the Court reaches the second and third issue,
the Court’s decision will provide guidance as to what constitutes
actual, substantial prejudice in prosecutorial delays and what
violates a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial.

82

Id. at 42 (citing State v. Dunfee, 114 P.3d 217 (Mont. 2005)).
Id.
84
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 46, at 7.
83

